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ABSTRACT
This work explores a scalable data analytics pipeline for real-time attack
detection through the use of customized honeypots at the National Center for
Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). Attack detection tools are common
and are constantly getting improved, but validating these tools is challenging.
One must automate how to identify what data is essential to detecting the
attack, extract this data from multiple different monitors, and send this data
to the attack detection tool. On top of this, one must be able to efficiently
scale with an ever-increasing amount of data, while also having the ability to
extend to new monitors. This requires an infrastructure that is non-trivial
to create or to deploy.
In this work, we present a generalized architecture that aims for a real-
time, scalable, and extensible pipeline that can be deployed in diverse in-
frastructures to validate arbitrary attack detection tools. To demonstrate
our architecture, we will show an example deployment of our pipeline using
completely open-sourced tools. Our example deployment uses as its sources:
1) a customized honeypot environment at NCSA, and 2) customized attack
scripts written to follow the skeleton of canonical credential-stealing attacks.
To extract useful information, we have deployed network and host-based
monitoring tools such as Bro and OSSEC. We have also built an attack de-
tection tool named AttackTagger that we will use as our front-end detection
engine.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
The overarching goals of this research are to develop a data analytics pipeline
for real-time attack detection (i.e. as early as possible, ideally before system
misuse) and validation of newly developed detection mechanisms and security
policies before being deployed in a real system. Security analysts attempt to
detect and prevent attacks, but frequently they cannot manually analyze all
of the information that is flowing in and out of the computing infrastructure.
Security teams and system administrators require better tools to automate
part, if not all, of the analysis essential to achieving early detection of attacks.
To detect attacks in their early stages, security analysts require tools to
perform high-accuracy, real-time attack detection. In our initial study, we
created a tool named AttackTagger that uses a type of probabilistic graphical
model (PGM) known as factor graphs to facilitate early detection of attacks.
We have demonstrated that AttackTagger detects most attacks (used in our
analysis) in their early stages before system misuse. However, we did not
validate whether AttackTagger works equally well on real-world data and
in a real-world environment. To validate that AttackTagger or any other
arbitrary attack detection tool works in a real-world environment, we have
created a real-world deployment of a scalable data analytics pipeline for real-
time attack detection. This pipeline is deployed at the National Center for
Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). Additionally, the pipeline is being
used to validate common approaches to attack detection and to build an
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infrastructure for real-time monitoring of attacks happening at NCSA. In this
work, we talk about our validation efforts in addition to the generalization
of this pipeline to arbitrary attack detection tools.
As part of our pipeline, we deployed and extended existing monitoring tools
to extract useful host and network information from the target infrastructure.
The process of mapping information generated on the host and network to the
alerts consumed by the attack detection tool was nontrivial. The mappings
needed to first be defined and then subsequently implemented and deployed.
In total, we deployed 6 unique monitoring tools and 32 new monitoring rules.
Finally, this work explores the transition from theory to practice in the
realm of cybersecurity and attack detection. Our attack detection pipeline
was created from the ground up with scalability and real-time requirements
in mind. We discuss how we have chosen each of our pipeline stages, why
they are necessary, and how they can be used in both online (in a produc-
tion setting) and oﬄine (for postmortem analysis and attack replay) modes.
Additionally, we discuss our deployment of this pipeline that is implemented
using all open-source tools.
The main contributions of this work are:
• A scalable data analytics pipeline for real-time attack detection that is
deployed at the NCSA
• Continuous real attack data from customized honeypots deployed at
the NCSA
• A suite of monitoring tools and extensions to these tools that extract
useful security-related information from host and network infrastruc-
tures
• Exploration of challenges of transitioning attack detection from theory
to practice
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1.2 Motivation
According to the SANS Institute’s Ninth Log Management Survey Report,
22% of security analysts spend 1-4 hours per week examining logs, while
another 22% spend more than a day per week [1]. So almost half (44%) of
the security analysts are spending at least half of a full work day looking
at logs. This is a significant amount of time. Furthermore, looking at raw
logs is something that security analysts should not have to do in most cases
if the security infrastructure is comprehensive. In the same report, 46% of
the respondents stated that using logs to detect advanced threats was their
most difficult task, because they were unable to correlate multiple log sources
together and distinguish between benign and malicious traffic. Additionally,
14% of respondents noted that normalization and categorization of logs and
security information is the hardest obstacle to overcome. All of these metrics
indicate a need to improve how we collect and analyze logs. To this end,
we have created a data analytics pipeline for real-time attack detection that
spans the entire attack detection process from input to output in both general
terms and in an example deployment. We provide insights on how to deploy
this sort of pipeline in any production setting. Also, we bridge the gap
between the log collection process and the attack detection process through
alert extraction and normalization.
1.3 Challenges
This work addresses difficult challenges that need to be overcome in order
to achieve the overall goal of attack detection before system misuse. These
challenges are a mix of issues that relate to both the theoretical and practical
aspects of attack detection.
• Identifying what information is useful for attack detection
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• Extracting useful information from the target infrastructure
• Normalizing all logs to a common format (so to enable efficient analysis)
• Scaling the data pipeline
There is a myriad of information available on target infrastructures that
can be extracted by monitoring tools. However, understanding what infor-
mation is useful and what information is not is very difficult. As you extract
more information, you start to drown out the more important information,
but extracting too little information may decrease the coverage of attacks
that can be detected. Additionally, the extracted information has to be rel-
evant to the attacks that the attack detection tool is trying to prevent.
Just identifying the information that is relevant to attacks is not enough
to stop those attacks. Identifying the important information allows security
analysts to look at data logs and find attacks after they occur, but the iden-
tification alone does not allow for a system that can detect those attacks
as soon as they happen. For the system to detect attacks in real-time, the
extraction of information must be automated in real-time. Some of the infor-
mation, such as syslogs, is fairly easy to extract from the system. However,
other information, such as malformed HTTP headers or new system services,
is not so easy. Monitors must be deployed in the target infrastructure at both
the host and network level to extract all information relevant to attacks and
give the attack detection tool the best chance to detect attacks.
Furthermore, data logs come in different formats. These formats include
logs from the host systems and logs from the network. Every monitoring
tool that creates a log is likely to have a different format. There usually are
not even consistent timestamps between logs. Beyond that, there is different
information in each log. To be able to correlate these heterogeneous logs, the
logs first need to be normalized into a consistent format.
The last major challenge is scaling our pipeline to an ever-increasing amount
of information. An attack detection pipeline that is not able to withstand the
4
throughput of data collected by security/system monitoring tools a few years
from now is fairly worthless. Therefore, we must build our attack detection
pipeline with scalability in mind, so that we are prepared for the future influx
of additional information and complexity.
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CHAPTER 2
APPROACH
2.1 Attack Detection
This part of the work was proposed because of a need to expand and test
attack detection tools such as AttackTagger (developed in our group [2]).
AttackTagger is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The preliminary results
(i.e., the attack detection accuracy and coverage) for AttackTagger were very
promising, but there is no clear indication that AttackTagger would perform
as well on non-ideal data that includes noise, randomness, and imperfect
alert extraction. To experiment on whether AttackTagger would work well
on non-ideal data, we sought out to create a tool that could be used to
validate not only AttackTagger, but also an arbitrary attack detection tool.
Our initial efforts evolved into the creation of an entire pipeline that could
be used for both online and oﬄine analysis of the target infrastructure.
2.2 Scalable Data Analytics Pipeline for Real-Time
Attack Detection
Our pipeline has a list of requirements. This list was made so that we would
have a concrete plan to test and run arbitrary attack detection tools now or
in the future. The requirements of the pipeline are the following:
• Scalability to the ever-increasing amount of data
• Real-time
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• Ability to validate any arbitrary inputs (e.g. alerts) and outputs
• Ability to repeat experiments
• Modular design using general, replaceable tools
• Deployable for online production use
• Deployable for oﬄine, postmortem log analysis and attack
Scalability to the ever-increasing amount of data
The number of alerts that are input to the pipeline increases over time be-
cause of added monitors and/or because of more hosts in the target infras-
tructure. The pipeline needs to be able to scale efficiently with the increase
of data.
Real-Time
The pipeline must support real-time delivery of alerts to the attack detection
tool. To support active monitoring of attacks, the attack detection tool must
be consuming a real-time stream of alerts.
Ability to validate any arbitrary inputs (e.g. alerts) and outputs
(e.g. attack detection tools)
The pipeline needs to be able to validate the importance and effectiveness of
different types of alerts that can be input to the attack detection tool. Addi-
tionally, the pipeline should facilitate validation of arbitrary attack detection
tools. Therefore, the pipeline needs to provide well-defined interfaces to be
used by the monitors and attack detection tool to communicate.
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Ability to repeat experiments
To test new attack detection tools on old attacks, we need repeatability in
our experiments. So the pipeline needs to be able to reingest alerts and
deliver them to the attack detection tool. The replay of attacks will allow
the pipeline to compare different attack detection tools against each other
on the exact same attacks.
Modular design using general, interchangeable tools
We want our pipeline to be easy to reproduce by other researchers, so that
they can validate their own attack detection tools. By creating a modu-
lar design with general tools, we allow other researchers to create a similar
pipeline by using different tools they choose as long as those tools fit a set of
requirements. For example, any monitoring tool can be used, so long as that
tool extracts useful information. In our pipeline, you could use the network
monitor Snort, instead of Bro. Overall, we want to create a skeleton pipeline
structure that others can easily mimic.
Deployable for online, production use
The pipeline needs to run in a production environment, such as an enterprise
network on a campus or at a company.
Deployable for oﬄine, postmortem log analysis and attack
detection tool testing
The pipeline needs to be able to run in an oﬄine mode so that security
analysts can do postmortem analysis of attacks. Running the pipeline in an
oﬄine mode allows the analysts to look more closely at the data logs on the
attacks that the attack detection tool may have mislabeled (i.e., labeled a
malicious user benign or a benign user malicious). Additionally, the pipeline
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needs to be able to ingest old logs so that attack detection tools can be tested
against old attacks.
2.3 Honeypots
To gather real, meaningful data, we have created and deployed custom hon-
eypots at NCSA. Honeypots are useful for several reasons. First, the obvious
advantage is having legitimate temporal data that you can extract because of
running the honeypots on a real system that attracts real inter-arrival times
of events corresponding to system activities. The real data gives you time
delays and spikes in events with variability that you cannot exactly simulate
in a lab setting.
Secondly, you get real random attacks that you cannot create by yourself
without losing the randomness or altering the realness of the attack. Honey-
pots can be deployed to make the systems look like real, tantalizing machines
for the potential attacker to compromise.
Additionally, honeypots can support different hardware/software platforms
(e.g., different Linux releases). Variation in the machines allows researchers
to conduct analysis over the frequency of attacks for each of the different
OSes and determine whether the attacks are random, targeted at less secure
OS versions, or possibly performed based on some other metric. Analysis
cannot be done without enticing the attackers to the honeypots, since we
cannot create an environment on our own to emulate attacks or mimic the
thought process of an intruder.
Finally, the data mined from the honeypots can be used by our attack
detection pipeline. The NCSA data mined in our previous study (i.e., the
initial work on design and evaluation of AttackTagger) include sample raw
syslogs, Bro (network monitoring) logs, and Netflows, but these logs are
incomplete and not always available, Bro is constantly changing (as a result
of new development and addition of new features) and having the Bro logs
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as of when the logs were created is not always sufficient. For example, you
cannot rerun the current version of Bro on the past incidents without having
full packet captures of the incidents, which makes the old logs obsolete. In
addition, the NCSA syslogs have useful information on the system, but lack a
lot of the more useful host information, such as program execution and bash
logs. Because of the lack of practical data, we need new data that is more
complete, real, and can be used in the future, which is what our honeypots
give us.
2.4 Extracting Alerts
Our earlier analysis of data on security incidents at NCSA [2] identified over
50 alerts related to credential-stealing attacks. Credential-stealing attacks
are attacks in which the attacker enters the system with valid credentials
(e.g., a username and password), thus bypassing traditional network authen-
tication. Of these alerts, 34 were actually used in the design of AttackTagger.
In this work, we bridge the gap between the defined alerts and the extrac-
tion of these alerts by creating a suite of host and network monitoring tools
as well as extensions to these tools that can be used to extract the most
useful information from the target infrastructure. Some of the alerts that
were defined in our previous work require significant infrastructure changes
to be extracted from the data logs that are generated during the system
operation. Therefore, not all of the alerts that were used in AttackTagger
could be extracted in practice and cannot be used in this study. However, we
have added additional alerts that are prevalent in credential-stealing attacks
and were not defined in the previous analysis. Overall, we have extracted 33
alerts that are related to credential-stealing attacks. Of these alerts, 14 are
network-based and the remaining 19 are host-based. While our extraction
focuses on credential-stealing attacks, the same process could be used to ex-
tract information on other types of attacks. A full list of the alerts that are
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extracted and used in this work is shown in Appendix A.
The alert extraction is done by monitoring tools that are deployed on the
hosts and network of the target infrastructure. These tools are discussed in
Section 4.4.2. There are many commercial and open-source monitors avail-
able, but the most difficult and important aspect of the extraction process is
knowing which monitors to use and what information to extract. We started
with a set of alerts defined by our previous research, but we had no way of
actually getting the corresponding information from the target infrastruc-
ture, since a large majority of those alerts were manually extracted from
hand-written incident reports by security analysts. An example of an alert
that we were unable to extract without significant infrastructure change is
the ALERT ILLEGAL USER ACTIVITY alert, which is raised when the user on a
system does something that is considered to be illegal. However, the defini-
tion of illegal in this case is completely up to the security analysts and ranges
anywhere from a simple malware download to using a machine as an open
proxy. Alerts such as ALERT ILLEGAL USER ACTIVITY are triggered based on
the security analyst’s intuition and knowledge, so implementation is difficult.
For the alerts that we could extract, the process of mapping each of the alerts
to a monitor or a monitoring rule was long and arduous. Our pipeline has
adopted 6 unique open-source monitoring tools, custom scripts, and custom
configurations for all of these tools. In total, 32 new rules were created in
these monitoring tools to allow for the comprehensive extraction of alerts.
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CHAPTER 3
PIPELINE DESIGN
3.1 Overview
This chapter discusses the general design of our scalable data analytics pipeline
for real-time attack detection. All tools used in each stage of the pipeline
are modular, which means that any tool that meets the requirements of any
stage of the pipeline can be deployed at that stage of the pipeline. Figure
3.1 outlines the overall architecture of the pipeline and is the centerpiece of
this chapter. Each section explains a specific stage of the pipeline in general
terms.
3.2 Data Source
The data source is the entity that is to be monitored. Example data sources
include workstations, phones, routers, and any other device that can be a
potential attack target. These devices almost always have some sort of mech-
anisms to log important system information. For example, GNU/Linux has
the /var/log folder where syslogs are logged for things such as kernel logs,
authentication logs, and package logs. Some of these logs that are gener-
ated by the system can be directly used in security analysis, thus adding
no additional overhead to the system. However, not all information that is
important to cyber-attacks is collected automatically by the system, which
is why we need automated extraction of such information by monitors.
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Figure 3.1: Pipeline architecture
3.3 Monitors
The monitors are the tools that extract useful information from the data
source. We break them down into two categories: 1) Host monitors, and
2) Network monitors. The host monitors extract information from what
happens on the hosts themselves (e.g. workstations). For example, the host
monitors could look at what commands the user is executing, what ports
are open, or what files have changed. Network monitors extract information
that is being sent over the network on the target infrastructure, such as the
traffic between a workstation and a webserver. This traffic between hosts
is analyzed and important information is retrieved and alerted on by the
network monitor. Examples of the extraction process include looking for
malformed packets, checking payloads for malware signatures, and looking
for anomalous hosts.
3.4 Log Aggregation
The log aggregation stage is used to aggregate all of the logs into a central
location so the attack detection tool can act on individual events recorded in
the logs as well as correlate the data from different logs. It is necessary for
all communications in the aggregation step to be encrypted via TLS/SSL to
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ensure that an attacker cannot insert, delete, or modify the logs before they
reach the log aggregator. Figure 3.2 illustrates the system setup for the log
aggregation stage.
Figure 3.2: Log aggregation setup
3.5 Log Normalization
Log normalization is used to transform heterogeneous logs into one homoge-
neous format. For the attack detection to correlate between heterogeneous
log types, information must be extracted from the logs into a unified format
so that they can all be treated as a single log type. Normalizing the logs
decreases the complexity of the attack detection tool significantly.
3.6 Message Queue
At this stage, the pipeline splits into two divergent paths. The bottom path
(see Figure 3.1) is for real-time detection, where the online analysis of alerts
happens. To ensure that no messages are dropped by the attack detection
tool, a queue is added to allow the pipeline to deal with fluctuations in
the throughput of alerts from the monitors. By adding a queue, the attack
detection tool will never miss events that occur, allowing for an elasticity of
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the pipeline to cope with variability in the throughput of the events. However,
if the alerts constantly arrive faster than the attack detection tool can analyze
them, the queue may grow unboundedly.
3.7 Attack Detection Tool
The attack detection tool is the main computational engine of the pipeline
and will likely determine whether the pipeline can support real-time detec-
tion. The attack detection tool consumes and processes alerts from the mes-
sage queue to detect attacks in real time. While our attack detection tool in
this study is AttackTagger (explained in detail in Chapter 5), the proposed
pipeline allows integrating any tool that can act on a set of alert inputs.
3.8 Log Storage
The top half of the pipeline (see Figure 3.1) split starts with a log storage
tool. The top path is used for both online and oﬄine/postmortem analysis.
Once the logs are consumed by the attack detection tool, they are discarded
either after a short time or immediately. However, the log storage stage gives
us the ability to look back through all of the logs in their entirety, which is
essential for security analysts so that they can check the validity of the attack
detection tool and also look for false positives/negatives.
3.9 Data Visualization
Logs are numerous and looking at them line-by-line is tedious and not scal-
able. A better way of looking for anomalies and trends in the logs is to visu-
alize the data. Visualizing the data gives the security analysts a way examine
a large amount of data in a small amount of space and time. Data visual-
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ization tools can show important information such as geographical maps of
login IPs, logins per day, and alerts per day.
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CHAPTER 4
PIPELINE DEPLOYMENT
4.1 Experimental Setup
Our pipeline was set up using two servers that run on-site at the National
Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). Server 1 contained a 24-
core Intel Xeon X5650 processor running at 2.67GHz and 32GB RAM run-
ning at 1333MHz. Server 2 contained a 12-core Intel Xeon X5650 processor
running at 2.67GHz and 24GB RAM running at 1333MHz. We ran experi-
ments with two honeypot VMs, both on Server 1. Server 1 and 2 were both
running CentOS 7.1, while the honeypot VMs were running Ubuntu 12.04
and CentOS 6.7, respectively. The hypervisor that we used was QEMU with
KVM. Each honeypot had 1 virtual CPU and 1 GB RAM.
4.2 Overview
Our pipeline configuration is shown in Figure 3.1. In this configuration, we
have used only free, open-source tools. By using only free and open-source
tools, anyone can recreate and/or change the data pipeline without having
to pay for software. Anyone who would like to obtain the source code for our
deployment can find instructions in Appendix B. In addition to being free
and open-source, all of these tools are modular and can be swapped out for
different tools depending on the preferences or needs of the system admin-
istrator. The Honeypot VMs on the NCSA network are GNU/Linux-based
and come with specific monitoring tools already installed. These tools are
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Snoopy Logger, RKHunter, and OSSEC. Snoopy Logger captures all execve
system calls made to the kernel and writes each call to a log once the execve
call completes. Having a log of all execve calls allows for visibility of all
program executions, regardless of which user executed them. RKHunter is a
mature program for detecting rootkits, suspect files, and system misconfigu-
rations. OSSEC is Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) that takes
in logs of many types and performs actions based on those logs (e.g. raising
alerts, active responses). We use OSSEC to centralize and correlate all of
the host-based logs directly on the host. The host-based logs can be thought
of as micro-events that are used as input to OSSEC, which then does simple
rule-based correlation and outputs macro-events. By doing the micro-event
correlation directly on the host before the logs are shipped, we are able to sig-
nificantly reduce the amount of data flowing through the pipeline. However,
the correlation could be moved off-host for security or convenience reasons.
Alongside OSSEC, a tool named Bro (explained in Section 4.4.1) does
similar micro-event correlation, but on network traffic as opposed to host
logs. Bro is a Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS). Unlike
OSSEC, Bro is running directly on the bare metal host instead of running
inside of the honeypots. Bro does deep packet analysis on all packets inbound
and outbound to/from the honeypots. To do this, we feed Bro traffic from a
virtual span port of the honeypot network interface, giving Bro full visibility
to the traffic on the Honeypot VMs. Bro takes in the honeypot traffic and
outputs alerts based on it. These outputs are macro-events similar to the
outputs of OSSEC.
On the Honeypot VMs, the macro-events are shipped to a log collection
and normalization tool called Logstash. OSSEC outputs a JavaScript Object
Notation (JSON) alert file of macro-events. Then the alert file is shipped to
Logstash using a forwarding tool called Logstash-Forwarder, which supports
full SSL encryption. Since Bro is running on the bare metal, Logstash-
Forwarder does not need to be used and the Bro log files can just be tailed
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by Logstash. With all of the logs now centralized on the bare metal, they can
be shipped off host and then normalized into a consistent format. Logstash
supports many different input types and can change the input as needed to
make whatever output is necessary, which makes it relatively easy to normal-
ize the Bro and OSSEC logs into a single format, which can be consumed by
the attack detection tool.
Just as it supports many input types, Logstash also supports many out-
put types and can output to multiple places simultaneously. A common
architecture for log analysis is the ELK stack, which is an acronym for Elas-
ticsearch, Logstash, and Kibana. These are tools developed and maintained
by the company Elastic. Since all of the tools are co-developed, deployment
is a breeze. Elasticsearch is a datastore that is very quick at indexing large
amounts of data, so that it can be useful for fast analysis. Kibana is a tool
used for data visualization. Logstash outputs the normalized macro-events
to Elasticsearch on the top path of the pipeline. On the last leg of the top
path, Kibana queries Elasticsearch to get data and then creates graphics for
visual analysis. Visualizing the data is helpful for real-time and post-mortem
analysis of logs as it is easier to look at logs visually than it is to look at
them line-by-line.
On the bottom half of the pipeline, Logstash uses a second output to
output the normalized macro-events to Kafka. Kafka is a high-throughput
and horizontally scalable distributed messaging queue, which is able to handle
hundreds of megabytes of reads and writes per second from thousands of
clients. Since the attack detection tool will take time to do its detection, it
is possible that the logs could come more quickly than the tool can analyze
them. To help alleviate this, a queue is used to temporarily save the events,
so that nothing is lost if the detection tool is overwhelmed for a certain
amount of time. The detection tool consumes the macro-events from the
Kafka queue and performs its detection based on these macro-events. In
our deployment, the detection tool is AttackTagger. The final output of
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the pipeline is a breakdown of users and their associated user state (benign,
suspicious, malicious) as well as other inferred attributes about the users.
Each of the different tools is explained in more detail in Sections 4.3 - 4.10.
4.3 Data Source: Honeypots
In our experiments, we deployed two honeypots at NCSA on an IP space
external to the NCSA network. These honeypots are running Ubuntu 12.04
and CentOS 6.7, respectively. On each honeypot, a full suite of carefully
selected monitoring tools was installed to extract security-related informa-
tion from the host. The monitors are necessary to get a complete view of
the security-pertinent information of the honeypots. Without this security
information, we would have little visibility into the host and thus little ability
to detect attacks that would happen on the host. A full description of the
monitors that were installed on the honeypots is given in Section 4.4.2.
The honeypots were run in VMs on Server 1 and were installed fresh prior
to deployment. Common software packages such as vim, git, and Logstash-
Forwarder were installed on the honeypots to facilitate the setup of the mon-
itoring tools and the shipping of the logs off of the host. Beyond that,
the machines were vanilla versions of Ubuntu 12.04 and CentOS 6.7. The
only package that was specifically installed was OpenSSH [3]. Both of the
honeypots allowed incoming SSH connections by password or public key au-
thentication and were open to the entire internet. Additionally, SSH root
logins were allowed. However, because of issues over the external IP space,
outbound connections from the honeypots were disabled.
Along with the root user, a single user was created on each honeypot:
ubuntu for the Ubuntu honeypot and admin for the CentOS honeypot. These
usernames were chosen from usernames that were frequently being used to
attempt SSH bruteforces on computers we were using for development. The
usernames were also paired with easily-crackable dictionary-word passwords.
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These passwords were ubuntu and admin respectively. The root password
was a randomly created string of 16 characters.
4.3.1 Honeypot Security Risk
To minimize risk of NCSA compromise from the use of the honeypots, the
following measures were put in place:
1. The honeypots were placed inside VMs.
2. A host-based firewall was deployed on Server 1 to limit outbound to a
single private network.
3. A host-based firewall was deployed on the Server 2 to only allow in-
bound traffic from the private network.
The first measure to deter attackers was to place the honeypots inside
VMs. By placing the honeypots inside VMs, the attacker would have to
break out of the VM and onto the actual bare-metal server to have any
control over anything but the honeypot. VM escape attacks exist [4], but the
vulnerabilities that are exploited to allow these attacks are patched quickly
after the attack is found in the wild. We used fully-patched QEMU with
KVM to create our virtualization environment [5], [6].
The second measure to minimize risk to the NCSA was to set up a host-
based firewall on Server 1, which was running the honeypots. The honeypot
networking setup is shown in Figure 4.1. To make sure that Server 1 would
not be compromised, it only allowed inbound SSH connections from the in-
ternal NCSA network, the IllinoisNet wireless network, and the Illinois wired
network. Additionally, Server 1 disabled all outbound SSH connections. For
the attacker to be able to use Server 1 as an attack vector into NCSA, they
would have to SSH bruteforce the login credentials from one of the three al-
lowed networks and then gain root access to turn off the host-based firewall.
Only then would the attacker have access to the NCSA network directly.
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Figure 4.1: Honeypot networking
The last security measure was to limit incoming traffic to Server 2 over the
private network. Security measure 2 limited the outgoing traffic from Server
1 to Server 2, and so security measure 3 limits the same traffic from the
other side, i.e. from Server 2. To accomplish this, a host-based firewall was
deployed on Server 2 to only allow traffic on the private network over TCP
port 5001, which is Logstash. Logstash is the aggregation and forwarding
tool that is used to securely ship the data between the servers. The only
traffic allowed between Server 1 and Server 2 is TCP port 5001. Thus, the
attacker would have to execute a zero-day attack against Logstash to have a
change of getting control of Server 2.
All in all, the attacker would have to perform the following actions to
successfully compromise an NCSA machine using the honeypots:
1. SSH bruteforce the honeypots.
2. Perform a zero-day VM escape attack to get directly onto the bare
metal of Server 1.
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3. Obtain root access on Server 1 via bruteforce or some zero-day root
exploit.
4. Execute a zero-day attack on Logstash over TCP port 5001 that allows
remote control of the receiving server (Server 2).
Because of the sophistication, technical acumen, and effort required to not
only find these exploits, but to successfully perform them, we believe that
the risk to the NCSA is incredibly low. Furthermore, if an attacker was
able to successfully execute each of the steps above, we would now be able
to uncover and study a new VM escape attack, a new root exploit attack,
and a new Logstash attack. These findings would be invaluable for research
purposes, though we find this possibility incredibly unlikely to happen.
A more detailed diagram of the honeypots along with all of the pipeline
tools is shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Detailed diagram of pipeline deployment at NCSA
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4.3.2 Genuine Attackers
The activity in the honeypots is driven in two different ways. The first way is
the typical way that honeypots are used, e.g. by enticing attackers to attack
the honeypots and watching what they do. In our honeypots we entice the
attackers by setting up VMs with very weak and easily-crackable usernames
and passwords. The problem with these weak passwords, however, is that
the attacks are at the mercy of the attackers. Some attackers are constantly
sniffing the entire internet for open ports, but even in those cases you still
have to wait for them to find your honeypot before they will attack you.
Because of the unpredictability, it is uncertain how much data the honeypots
will be able to mine over any given period of time, which is why we created
a second way to drive the honeypots (explained in Section 4.3.3).
4.3.3 Attack Scripts
To give a more consistent stream of the attacks happening on the honeypots,
we created our own attack scripts. These scripts use variants of the following
structure, which is very similar to the structure of the attacks seen in [2].
1. Login
• e.g. From an anomalous host
2. Gather information
• e.g. Execute commands such as uname, ps, id
3. Prepare compromise
• e.g. Download and compile root exploit
4. Compromise system
• e.g. Execute root exploit
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5. Prepare attack
• e.g. Download malicious SSH daemon
6. Execute attack
• e.g. Replace SSH daemon with malicious version
7. Establish backdoor
• e.g. Add authorized keys
8. Clear traces
• e.g. Delete log files
By creating our own attack scripts, we were able to reliably run attacks
and test our attack detection whenever we pleased. In addition, we were able
to create variants off of these attack scripts and test out how well the attack
detection works on attack variants. Since the attacks very closely resemble
actual attacks that happened at NCSA, we believe that they are an adequate
representation of actual credential-stealing attacks.
A sample of one of the attack scripts is shown in Listing 4.1.
Listing 4.1: Attack Script
1 spawn ssh $username@$victimip −p $v ic t import
2 expect ”password : ”
3 send ”$password\ r ”
4 send −− ” export HISTSIZE=0\r ”
5 send −− ” gcc /tmp / . systemd . c −o /tmp/ systemdc\ r ”
6 send −− ”cd /tmp\ r ”
7 send −− ” ./ systemdc\ r ”
8 send −− ”rm /tmp / . systemd . c /tmp/ systemdc\ r ”
9 send −− ”rm /tmp / . pubkey\ r ”
10 send −− ” e x i t \ r ”
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In our attack scripts, we first perform an SSH bruteforce attack on a specific
IP and port. After successfully logging in, the script copies a payload to the
target. In Listing 4.1, the payloads are .systemd.c and .pubkey. Once
the payloads are copied onto the system, a Linux program named expect
runs a series of commands that are shown in Listing 4.1. The commmands
include turning off BASH history, compiling a malicious binary, executing
the malicious binary, and finally removing the binary from the system. We
will see in Section 6.2 that the attack script structure is very similar to the
structure of real attacks that are seen in the wild.
4.4 Monitors
Monitors are tools used to extract useful information from systems. The in-
formation that is extracted is related to security and helps us make inferences
about the user based on what we observe. The information can come from
any source related to the system, such as a log file or an IDS. Having both
network-based and host-based monitors gives a much more complete view
of the system and infrastructure that is being secured from attacks. In our
experiments, both network-based and host-based monitors are deployed onto
the honeypots at NCSA, allowing us to extract as much useful information as
possible and giving us the best chance to detect attacks before the attackers
are able to misuse the system.
4.4.1 Network-based Monitors
Network-based monitors monitor the network activity between the target
host and any other host. Examples of what can be monitored over the
network include protocol, payload, and number of packets. Monitoring the
network can lead to the detection of distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks, anomalous hosts, or even known malware downloads. There are also
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many other performance and security-specific events that can be monitored.
Examples of network-based monitors include netflows, NIDS, and router logs.
Along with supporting security-specific detection, network-based monitoring
can also be used to detect regular network problems such as slow or oﬄine
servers or abnormal amounts of device connections. Bringing all of these
monitoring capabilities together, we are able to get a comprehensive view of
what is happening on the network.
Bro
Bro is an open source network security monitor written by Vern Paxson at
the International Computer Science Institute (ICSI) in Berkeley, California
[7]. Bro is currently co-developed by ICSI and NCSA and is funded by the
National Science Foundation (NSF). Bro can be used as an NIDS, but is much
more, as it gives you the ability to view the entire network infrastructure and
see exactly what is happening between every computer on the network. Bro
has been compared to other systems such as tcpdump, Snort, and netflow.
Bro is split up into two main components. The first component is the event
engine. The event engine takes in the stream of live or stored network traffic
and outputs a series of events based on what Bro saw in the traffic. These
events are agnostic to security implications and are just a representation of
the traffic that occurred.
The second main component of Bro is the script interpreter. The script
interpreter executes event handlers written in a scripting language that was
custom built with Bro. These scripts define the security implications of
the events that happened over the network. Bro comes with an extensive
set of predefined scripts that allows the user to define their own security
policy and take the actions that they desire when certain activities happen.
In addition, Bro allows users to write their own custom scripts for Bro to
execute during production. The Bro scripting language is Turing complete,
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so any program that you can write in any language can be written in the
Bro scripting language. Because of this, Bro is extendable to any needs of
the user.
The Bro architecture is outlined in Figure 4.3
Figure 4.3: Bro architecture
Critical Stack Intel Client
The Critical Stack Intel Client is a tool that collects and delivers indicator
feeds of malicious domains, addresses, and URLs [8]. At the time of this
writing, the Intel Client contained 97 feeds and almost 1.5 million indicators.
To make things easy, the Critical Stack Intel Client can hook into the Bro
Intelligence Framework and create notices when it sees connections match-
ing the indicators in the Intel Client. In tandem with Bro, the Critical Stack
Intel Client can be used to detect malicious connections in any network in-
frastructure. The Critical Stack Intel Client is especially useful in detecting
malware downloads, phishing websites, and anomalous SSH logins.
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4.4.2 Host-based Monitors
Host-based monitors monitor activity that happens directly on the target
host. Anything which creates a history of what happened on the host would
be referred to as a host-based monitor. Consequently, there are lots of
host-based monitors that already exist on every modern operating system.
GNU/Linux, for example, outputs logs such as kern.log, dpkg.log, and
auth.log in the directory /var/log by default. Many other programs will
automatically log errors and other important information related to their per-
formance while they are being executed. These logs can be very important
when detecting potential attacks on the system. In addition to these de-
fault monitors, extra monitors can be placed on the target system to extract
supplementary information that is important to attacks. Since host-based
monitors are deployed directly onto the host, they have access to everything
that the potentially malicious user does on the system. Examples of events
to monitor on the system include fingerprinting the OS, deleting log files,
and restarting system services. All of these events can be detected using a
combination of multiple different host-based monitors.
OSSEC
Open Source SECurity (OSSEC) is an open-source and free HIDS [9]. Cre-
ated by Daniel Cid and open-sourced in 2004, OSSEC was acquired by Trend
Micro in 2009. However, OSSEC is still being developed and continues to be
both open-source and free. In our pipeline, we use OSSEC to aggregate all of
our host-based monitors, including anything that we have deployed to keep
track of the state of the host in any capacity related to security. Because we
combine all of the host-based logs into OSSEC, we only have a single exit
point of host-based logs to ship off to the next stage of the pipeline. OSSEC
is able to ingest vast amounts of logs and different log types, which allows it
to take all of the other host-based monitors as inputs. Using these logs, OS-
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SEC generates alerts based on a set of default and user-defined rules. These
alerts are normalized to a consistent format as outputs from OSSEC. Since
all of the host-based monitors are now normalized, our job is much easier to
try and normalize them with the network-based monitors
OSSEC comes installed with over 600 default rules. Along with that, we
have added 21 new rules to supplement our analysis. A breakdown of all
of the alerts that we extract through these rules is given in Appendix A.
However, we have still not fully utilized OSSEC’s potential to monitor the
host, because of its great extendibility to define arbitrary rules and ingest
arbitrary logs. The possibilities are endless and so OSSEC is a great tool to
use in the long run thanks to its extendibility.
Snoopy
Snoopy is a utility that intercepts all execve system calls to the kernel [10]. In
Linux, all programs must be executed using the execve system. Therefore,
Snoopy has visibility over every program that is executed on the system.
After intercepting the execve call, Snoopy extracts the program name, ar-
guments, and a number of other configurable parameters and logs them all
using the syslog protocol. The logging finishes with a log file being created
that is easily parseable by humans and computers alike. Snoopy is able to
log every program execution and give a complete view of the system’s pro-
gram execution. Given this, it is obvious that Snoopy is a very powerful
monitoring tool to use, especially for security purposes. Snoopy allows us to
see into exactly what the attacker executes on the system so we can not only
monitor what they are doing to detect attacks, but also study every aspect
of the attack after the payload is executed. Additionally, if attackers are not
found by the attack detection tool, we can look back through the Snoopy
logs to see what was missed.
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RKHunter
Rootkit Hunter (RKHunter) is a free, open source utility that scans UNIX-
like systems for the presence of rootkits and other unwanted tools [11].
RKHunter works by comparing the SHA-1 hashes of important files and
programs on the system against a repository of known good hashes for those
files. If the hashes on the system do not match the known good files in the
online repository, then an alert is raised. Additionally, RKHunter will look
for hidden files, strange permissions, and the existence of known bad files on
the system. RKHunter can be run manually or be scheduled on the system
via a scheduler such as Cron. Every time RKHunter is run, it outputs a log
file containing the results of the system scan. RKHunter can be thought of
as an anti-malware program for Unix-like systems.
BASH Logs
The Snoopy utility captures all program executions on the system, but not all
commands that are typed into a shell are programs. For example, commands
such as pwd, ls, and unset are internals to the BASH shell. Since the BASH
program handles them internally, there is no execve call to log using Snoopy.
To circumvent this lack of logging, we have added an extension to the global
bashrc file to be run on all BASH shells. The extension logs the BASH
history file to syslog after each command is executed. So, all commands, not
just the ones that cause a program execution, will be logged to syslog via
the BASH extension. Thus, if a user tries to do an unset BASH HISTORY the
command would be seen in the BASH logs, even though it would not appear
in the Snoopy logs.
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Syslogs
Syslog is a protocol defined by RFC 5424 that is used to log event notifica-
tions [12]. Syslogs are the standard logging mechanism for most GNU/Linux
operating systems. Common log files that are used for day-to-day system
maintenance and program analysis are created using the syslog protocol.
Examples of these logs include the auth.log, kern.log, and dpkg.log files.
Syslogs are the system’s way of sending information from the system to the
user so that the user can maintain a pseudo-state of what has happened on
the host in the past. The syslog protocol aligns very well with our goals of
monitoring the system for attacks, and we can leverage logs created by syslog
to detect events such as failed passwords, system service shutdowns/restarts,
and package installations.
4.5 Log Aggregation: Logstash-Forwarder
The log aggregation is done by a tool named Logstash-Forwarder [13]. Logstash-
Forwarder is an open-source tool that is managed by the company Elastic.
It is also the input tool for the log normalization tool, Logstash. Origi-
nally named lumberjack, Logstash-Forwarder has evolved to make log col-
lection from multiple hosts very simple. By deploying small programs, such
as Logstash-Forwarder, the system is able to maintain a low memory and
computational footprint, while the collector is able to do all of the advanced
processing work on the logs. The network protocol that Logstash-Forwarder
uses is named lumberjack in homage to the original name of the tool and sup-
ports full SSL encryption. Recently a new tool named filebeat was adopted by
Elastic to replace Logstash-Forwarder. However, in this work only Logstash-
Forwarder is used.
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4.6 Log Normalization: Logstash
Log normalization in our pipeline is done by a collector machine running
a tool called Logstash [14]. Logstash, written in Go, takes its input from
the log aggregation tool Logstash-Forwarder and processes these inputs into
a normalized format. Like Logstash-Forwarder, Logstash is a tool that is
maintained by the company Elastic. Logstash is able to use its variety of
165+ plugins to consume and process a multitude of different log formats and
also has the ability to extend to custom log formats. Logstash also supports
many different input protocols and can extend to custom sources using user-
generated plugins. Taking logs from different sources, Logstash normalizes
the data based on a set of rules or plugins to any custom format that the user
desires. Extendibility makes Logstash perfect for our deployment, because
it allows for the addition of new monitors and new data that is relevant to
security applications.
An example of the log normalization process in our pipeline is shown in
Figures 4.4 and 4.5. Figure 4.4 shows example logs from multiple different
host-based and network-based monitoring tools. Figure 4.5 shows an example
of a normalized output of the heterogeneous log inputs, which is what the
logs look like in our pipeline once they are about to be sent into the two
divergent paths.
34
Figure 4.4: Example of heterogeneous logs
Figure 4.5: Example of normalized log
4.7 Message Queue: Kafka
Apache Kafka is self-proclaimed as a high-throughput distributed messaging
system [15]. In our pipeline, we use Kafka to deliver messages from Logstash
to our attack detection tool, AttackTagger, and also to act as a queue that
will absorb fluctuations in the throughput of alerts being created. Kafka
gives the pipeline an elasticity that is useful for maintaining attack detection
without dropping alerts. Additionally, Kafka is horizontally scalable and
fault-tolerant due to its distributed design. Horizontally scalable means that
Kafka can process larger streams of data by adding more nodes. Finally,
Kafka is fast. According to [15], “A single Kafka broker can handle hundreds
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of megabytes of reads and writes per second from thousands of clients.”
4.8 Attack Detection Tool: AttackTagger
The deployed attack detection, AttackTagger is discussed in detail in Chapter
5.
4.9 Log Storage: Elasticsearch
Elasticsearch is a distributed search engine that is built on top of Apache
Lucene [16]. Currently developed by the company Elastic, Elasticsearch
stores data and performs near real-time analytics on that data. It is massively
distributed, allowing it to scale well by adding more nodes to the system. In
addition, Elasticsearch is highly available and will automatically rebalance or
reorganize data when it detects a non-responsive node as a result of storing
the data into shards and replicating these shards on one or multiple nodes.
In the pipeline, Elasticsearch is useful for both online and oﬄine analysis of
logs.
4.10 Data Visualization: Kibana
The data visualization tool that we use is Kibana, because of its easy in-
tegration with our log storage tool, Elasticsearch [17]. Kibana is built on
top of Elasticsearch and queries Elasticsearch to create plots, graphs, maps,
and more. These visuals can be defined by the user and give the user the
ability to see a large volume of information in a small amount of space. A
sample of a Kibana dashboard from our pipeline is shown in Figure 4.6. The
figure visualizes many different aspects of the target infrastructure, including
IP addresses with the most alerts, the most frequent alerts, the number of
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events per day, and the users with the most alerts.
Figure 4.6: A sample Kibana dashboard
37
CHAPTER 5
ATTACKTAGGER
5.1 Overview
AttackTagger is an attack detection tool created in our research group [18]
that uses the Probabilistic Graphical Model (PGM) known as factor graphs
to infer hidden user states over a sequence of user events. The tool is tuned
to detect events that are relevant to credential-stealing attacks. By creating
factor functions and reading in the sequence of user events, AttackTagger is
able to detect malicious users relatively early (i.e. before system misuse) in
most cases.
5.2 Factor Graphs
A factor graph is a type of PGM that subsumes both Bayesian networks and
Markov networks, meaning that every Bayesian network or Markov network
can be expressed fully as a factor graph [19]. Factor graphs are able to
describe both causal and non-causal multivariate relationships. Factor graphs
represent these relationships using an undirected bipartite graph consisting
of random variable nodes and factor functions that connect these nodes.
The factor functions are used to represent the relations between the random
variables.
Given a sequence of user events E = {e1, e2, ..., et} and a corresponding
sequence of hidden user states S = {s1, s2, ..., st}, a per-user factor graph is
created. The factor functions represent the relations between the user events
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and the hidden user states, which is shown in Figure 5.1. A global score
function is used to sum up the factor functions for every possible sequence
of user states. The sequence of user states that yields the highest global
function score is chosen as the most likely sequence of user states. In the
case of AttackTagger, Gibbs sampling is applied to the factor graph so that
the time to compute the factor graph is bounded. The overall output of
AttackTagger is a sequence of user states which each correspond to a user
event. The possible user states are benign, suspicious, and malicious. An
example factor graph along with the user events and inferred hidden user
states is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
e1 e2
s1u s
2
u
e3
s3u
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
Figure 5.1: A generic factor graph with 3 events and 5 factor functions
Figure 5.2: An example of factor graphs in the scope of AttackTagger
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5.3 Defining Factor Functions
In AttackTagger, the factor functions are defined manually using a combina-
tion of attack research, expert knowledge, and knowledge of the system. The
factor functions represent common subsequences of attacks. For example, a
factor function could be defined to bias the model towards a malicious user
state if a user logged in right after there was an SSH bruteforce attempt.1
You would see a login immediately after countless failed login attempts in a
successful bruteforce attack. The corresponding factor function is defined in
Equation 5.1.
f(et−1, et, st−1, st) =

1 if et−1 == ALERT SSH BRUTEFORCE
& et == login
& st == malicious
0 otherwise
(5.1)
AttackTagger defined a total of 71 unique factor functions, but is not
limited to that number. However, there is effort required to create additional
factor functions, since they are created manually through research, expert
knowledge, and knowledge of the system. So while AttackTagger can define
more factor functions, lots of thought needs to be put in before they can be
added.
5.4 Extraction of Alerts
In the AttackTagger framework, all of the alerts are extracted manually from
hand-written incident reports. The AttackTagger dataset was 116 security
1An SSH bruteforce attack is an attack where the attacker repeatedly tries random
or targeted username and password combinations with the hope of guessing a correct
combination. Common strategies include using dictionary words for both the username
and password.
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incidents at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA),
but most of the incidents did not have any raw logs (i.e. syslogs, Bro logs,
etc.), so the alerts had to be inferred from the incident reports. Since these
were hand-written by security analysts, there was already inherent extraction
done by the analysts themselves. The extraction that the analysts did in the
NCSA incident reports is what is automated in our pipeline architecture. An
example of the manual AttackTagger alert extraction is shown in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: AttackTagger extraction of alerts from raw logs and
human-written incident reports
5.5 Experimental Setup
AttackTagger is written in Python and takes inputs from files. It is run
on an entire file of alerts at once, instead of feeding the alerts one by one.
The alerts that are input to AttackTagger must be in a pre-defined comma-
separate values (CSV) format. To this end, the log normalization must be
done oﬄine along with the extraction. As the alerts are read in, they are
added to a separate factor graph for each unique user that exists. Once all
of the factor graphs are created, AttackTagger infers the hidden user states
of each per-user factor graph and outputs the results. Additionally, the user
state inference is done on a complete factor graph, and must be recomputed
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fully for every new alert that is added. Because AttackTagger infers on an
entire factor graph, it must collect all of the alerts before computing the user
states.
5.6 Evaluation
AttackTagger performed very well when tested on the alerts that were ex-
tracted from the incident reports. In these experiments, AttackTagger was
able to correctly identify 46 out of 62 malicious users and only incorrectly la-
beled 19 out of 1,253 users as malicious when they were benign. Furthermore,
AttackTagger identified 41 out of the 46 malicious users before the system
misuse occurred. AttackTagger was compared against 3 different techniques,
namely rule classifier, decision tree, and support vector machine. A summary
of AttackTagger’s results is displayed in Table 5.1. As shown in the table,
AttackTagger had a significantly better true positive rate than any of the
other methods that were tested, while maintaining a modest false positive
rate. These promising results are what prompted our movement into testing
AttackTagger on a more real-world and less ideal dataset and what sparked
the creation of our data pipeline.
Table 5.1: AttackTagger evaluation
Name TP TN FP FN
AttackTagger 74.2 98.5 1.5 25.8
Rule Classifier 9.8 96.0 4.0 90.2
Decision Tree 21.0 100.00 0.00 79.0
Support Vector Machine 27.4 100.00 0.00 72.6
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5.7 Transitioning AttackTagger to a Real-world
Environment
To transition AttackTagger to a real-world environment, a few changes and
optimizations were made. To bound the computation time of the hidden
user state inference, the factor graph size was bounded to 20 alerts, which
we believe gives us sufficient knowledge of past alerts, while maintaining a
fairly low computation time.
Additionally, AttackTagger must recompute the entire per-user factor graph
every time a new alert is appended. Because of this, AttackTagger was made
into a multiprocessing tool. Moreover, every time a new event is input to
AttackTagger, a new computation process is spawned from a pool of pro-
cesses. The pool of processes is bounded by the number of CPU cores on the
system. If the inter-arrival of the alerts was ever less than the computation
time of AttackTagger, the alerts would queue up and so the latency between
the alert being raised and the user state associated with that alert being
computed would grow exponentially. By adding a pool of processes, Attack-
Tagger is able to start a computation on a new factor graph even when it is
not finished with its computation on a previous factor graph. While having
a pool of processes is a CPU hog, it is a stopgap that allows AttackTagger
to perform on a higher throughput of alerts.
The way that AttackTagger is currently set up, it is not in a state to
deal well with noise, randomness, and imperfect monitors in its inputs. The
reason that AttackTagger cannot perform well is because there are only factor
functions defined that express relationships between the current and previous
user events and user states. None of the factor functions look back further
than the previous user event or state. So any alerts that are not relevant
attack subsequences that are not back-to-back will not have any effect on
AttackTagger. Therefore, if extra alerts are added, alerts are switched around
in transport, or alerts are missed, AttackTagger will not be able to make good
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inferences about the user state. Because AttackTagger cannot currently deal
well with real data, we are completely overhauling our factor functions and
also creating factor functions further back than just the previous user event
and user state. This work is still in progress.
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CHAPTER 6
EVALUATION
6.1 Pipeline
In this section we discuss the bottlenecks of our deployed pipeline. We have
measured the alert throughput of the aggregation, normalization, queuing,
and attack detection stages of the online path of the pipeline.1
6.1.1 Aggregation and Normalization: Logstash
Here we discuss the computation and networking components of Logstash.
All logs are aggregated from the host and network monitors into a single
Logstash instance, shipped over the network to another Logstash instance,
and then normalized.
Computation
In our computation experiment for log aggregation, we wrote alerts to a log
that was being used as an input to Logstash and measured the input rate.
Each alert was around 200B large in its non-normalized format. We then
measured the output rate of alerts by Logstash. By having the input and the
output rates, we can determine the max throughput of Logstash when doing
log aggregation. We can see in Figure 6.1 that Logstash is able to output
alerts at the same rate that they are being input. However, in Figure 6.2, we
1Measurements were gathered with the help of undergraduate students Surya Bakshi
and Simon Kim.
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Figure 6.1: Alert creation rate vs. Logstash aggregation rate at 8365
alerts/s
see that the rate of alert creation is greater than the rate of output. Based
on these measurements we established that the throughput of the Logstash
log aggregation is somewhere between 8365 alerts/s and 9025 alerts/s.
In our computation experiment for log normalization, we used the same
setup. We wrote non-normalized logs to a file that was being used as input
to Logstash and measured the rate. Then we measured the rate at which
Logstash was able to output the normalized alerts. Figure 6.3 indicates that
Logstash is able to keep up with the alert generation, but the graph in Figure
6.4 shows that Logstash begins to lag behind, meaning that the max alert
throughput of the Logstash log normalization is somewhere between 1605
alerts/s and 1720 alerts/s.
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Figure 6.2: Alert creation rate vs. Logstash aggregation rate at 9025
alerts/s
Network
To test if the network is a bottleneck, we measured the rate of events writ-
ten to Logstash on the aggregator against the rate of events written out of
Logstash on the collector. Having both the input and output rates gives us
the throughput between Logstash instances including the network. In our ex-
periments, we were unable to write alerts at a rate greater than 940 alerts/s.
In Figure 6.5, we see that Logstash is able to normalize and output at the
same rate as the input when the input is at 940 alerts/s. Since both Logstash
instances have a throughput rate significantly higher than 940 alerts/s, we
attribute the smaller rate to the network.
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Figure 6.3: Alert creation rate vs. Logstash normalization rate at 1605
alerts/s
6.1.2 Queuing and Attack Detection: Kafka and Attack
Tagger
We produced alerts to Kafka, while having AttackTagger consuming from
Kafka. As a result, we found out that AttackTagger is the bottleneck of the
pipeline. In Figure 6.6, it is shown that AttackTagger lags behind the alert
creation, even at a tiny 0.10 alerts/s, which is only 1 event every 10 seconds.
Indeed, the small throughput was a likely result, since AttackTagger is the
computational engine of the pipeline. However, this means that our pipeline
is only as fast as our attack detection tool. It is slightly disconcerting as the
small AttackTagger throughput will greatly hamper our real-time aspirations.
But, as a pipeline, we have validated that we are able to support real-time
attack detection of up to 940 alerts/s in the worst case. With a better network
connection, our alert throughput could surely be increased. So, we believe
that this pipeline is suitable for use in a production setting when paired with
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Figure 6.4: Alert creation rate vs. Logstash normalization rate at 1720
alerts/s
the appropriate attack detection tool.
6.2 Honeypots
Our honeypots attracted a few interesting attacks from hackers around the
world. In this section, we discuss the actions and payloads of two such at-
tackers. These examples are included to illustrate the real attacks that we
attract on our honeypots. Along with these attacks, our data monitors mine
important information related to these attacks. However, these logs were
not used in the evaluation of AttackTagger, because of their randomness and
noise. In its current state, AttackTagger does not deal well with random-
ness and noise in the sequence of alerts that it uses as input. The issue of
randomness and noise in the alerts is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.
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6.2.1 squid64 Attack
The first attack that we attracted happened within the first 48 hours of the
honeypots being deployed. The attack targeted the Ubuntu honeypot and
came from an IP address located in Hong Kong. The attacker easily cracked
the username and password combination of ubuntu and ubuntu after only 75
failed attempts in just under 4 minutes. Once they were successfully logged
onto the system, they performed the following commands, which were mined
by Snoopy:
Attack Structure
Looking at the sequence of commands in Listing 6.1, we can dissect the
structure of the attack. Commands 1-3 fingerprint the system so that the
attacker can determine what exploit to run, what binary to use, and any
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Figure 6.6: Alert creation rate vs. AttackTagger output rate
other information needed to craft the attack. Commands 4-8 attempt to
create a new user butter. The user creation attempt was ultimately unsuc-
cessful because the user did not have root permissions. However, it seems
that they were attempting to create a new user to serve as a backdoor into
the system. Immediately afterwards in command 9, the attacker attempts to
make the /etc/.ssh directory immutable, which would disallow any writes
to the .ssh folder. Presumably, the attacker added their own ssh key to the
.ssh folder and this action was somehow missed by Snoopy. Command 10
starts execution of an ftp server so that the attacker has a medium over which
to transfer the desired payload. In this attack, that payload is the squid64
binary. Because the attacker pushed the binary to the system rather than
pulling it, we did not see an event (to be generated by our monitoring sys-
tem) corresponding to a download from the host. However, the Bro network
monitor did see multiple connections to anomalous hosts. In commands 11-
13 the attacker makes the binary executable, removes any currently running
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instances, and then executes the binary. Finally, in command 14 the attacker
removes the binary from the system to clear their traces. We were able to
get the binary because the file is not truly removed until all file descriptors
of the file have been closed. Since the file was still running in the honeypot,
we were able to extract the entire binary.
Listing 6.1: Attacker #1 Shell Commands
1 id
2 uname −m
3 uname −r
4 useradd −o −u 0 −g 0 −M −d / root −s / bin /bash butte r
5 bash −c echo \” xuelp123 \” | passwd −−s td in butte r
6 passwd −−s td in butte r
7 bash −c echo butte r : xuelp123 | chpasswd
8 chpasswd
9 chat t r +i / e t c / . ssh
10 / usr / l i b / openssh / s f tp−s e r v e r
11 chmod 755 /tmp/ squid64
12 k i l l a l l squid64
13 /tmp/ squid64
14 rm −f /tmp/ squid64
This attack looks and feels very much like an automated script. The
attacker’s structure does not change based on the failure of some of their
commands. Rather, they continue to execute subsequent commands that will
not work because of the previous failure. This can be seen in commands 4-8,
where the attacker fails at creating a new user, but still attempts to change
the password of that user. Additionally, most of the commands in the attack
sequence were actually executed twice. These were left for brevity. The
duplicates were executed with bash -c prepended to the command, which is
another clear indication of a script running commands in multiple different
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ways, aiming for the best chance of success.
Malware Analysis
Figure 6.7: Fixed IP address of squid64 malware
Figure 6.8: Crafted HTTP POST request in squid64 malware
We found many signs that pointed to the squid64 binary being a piece
of malware that added the host system to a botnet.2 First, we were able
to extract a fixed IP address inside of the malware that did not resolve
on a reverse DNS query and was also located in Hong Kong (Figure 6.7).
Most likely, the Hong Kong IP is the IP address of a Command and Control
(C&C) server. Next, we found a crafted HTTP POST request (Figures 6.8
and 6.9), which we believe to be a request sent to the C&C server to send
the server information. Along with the POST request, we found what looks
like a username and password to use as authentication into the C&C server
(Figures 6.10 and 6.11). At this point in our analysis, we are fairly certain
that the squid64 malware is for adding a machine to a botnet. Digging
further, we see that the binary also has a customized SSH server (Figure
6.12) using an old libssh 0.5.3 library (Figure 6.13), which was released in
November 2012. The latest version of libssh as of this writing is 0.7.2, which
2Malware analysis was performed on the squid64 binary by Phuong Cao.
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Figure 6.9: Function to make HTTP POST request in squid64 malware
Figure 6.10: Possible authentication username in squid64 malware
was released in September 2015. We also found a database of credentials
(Figure 6.14). On top of just the database, there is a function named crack
in the binary (Figure 6.15) and a hardcoded value named port that is set to
the value 22, which is the default SSH port. It would make sense that all of
these aspects of the binary exist to facilitate bruteforcing other SSH servers.
Likely, the malware attempts to replicate itself onto other machines by the
same SSH bruteforce method that gave the attacking machine access to our
honeypot.
Overall, it seems that the squid64 malware’s purpose is to add the machine
to a botnet. The malware talks to a C&C server to get instructions, sends
SSH login requests to other machines and attempts to bruteforce login, and
then sends the credential information back to the C&C server. However, we
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Figure 6.11: Possible authentication password in squid64 malware
Figure 6.12: Customized SSH server in squid64 malware
have not confirmed the behavior of the malware. Since our honeypots do not
allow outbound connections, there was no way for our network monitors to
detect any connections to the C&C server.
6.2.2 iptable Attack
This section explains an attack in which the attacker dropped and executed
a binary named iptable on the honeypot. Just like the squid64 attack,
the iptable attack targets the ubuntu honeypot and bruteforces the login
credentials quickly. The commands run after the attacker bruteforced the
honeypot are listed in Listing 6.2.
Attack Structure
We can see in Listing 6.2 that the iptable attack has a very similar approach
to the squid64 attack (Listing 6.1). So similar, in fact, that it seems likely that
these both originate from the same attacker or suite of malware, though they
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Figure 6.13: Old version of libssh library in squid64 malware
did not originate from the same IP address. Just like the squid64 malware,
we see commands 1-2 and 6 fingerprint the OS and gather information. In
commands 3-5 the attacker unsuccessfully attempts to create a new user with
the username butter. Afterwards, with command 7, the attacker starts up
an FTP server that is likely so that they can quietly push the malware onto
the system. Lastly, in commands 8-11 the attacker prepares the malware,
executes the binary, and removes the file from the system. Just like in the
squid64 case, we were able to extract the binary from the system because
it was still being executed by the honeypot and thus, the binary was not
actually removed from the system.
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Figure 6.14: Database of credentials in squid64 malware
Listing 6.2: Attacker #2 Shell Commands
1 uname −m
2 uname −r
3 useradd −o −u 0 −g 0 −M −d / root −s / bin /bash butte r
4 bash −c echo \” xuelp123 \” | passwd −−s td in butte r
5 bash −c echo butte r : xuelp123 | chpasswd
6 id −u
7 / usr / l i b / openssh / s f tp−s e r v e r
8 chmod 755 /tmp/ i p t a b l e
9 k i l l a l l i p t a b l e
10 /tmp/ i p t a b l e
11 rm −f /tmp/ i p t a b l e
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Figure 6.15: SSH crack function in squid64 malware
Malware Analysis
The iptable binary that was dropped and executed on the honeypot was
obfuscated and so we were unable to perform analysis on it. Therefore,
we are unsure of the exact specifications and capabilities of the malware.
We did find a threat advisory from 2014 by Akamai that talks of a botnet
that masks itself as a binary named .IptabLes or .IptabLex [20]. But our
iptable binary did not match any of the cryptographic hashes for these other
malwares.
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CHAPTER 7
RELATED WORK
There has been extensive research done on intrusion detection, specifically
into machine learning and statistical methods [21], [22], [23], [24]. Intrusion
detection methods are most often placed into categories based on whether
they are signature-based or anomaly-based [25]. Additionally, intrusion de-
tection can be split into either host-based and network-based [26]. Tools such
as OSSEC and Bro are examples of host-based and network-based intrusion
detection systems [9], [7]. In most research, attack detection is limited to
using either network-based information or host-based information, but not
both. For example, [21] is completely network-based in searching for ob-
fuscated network attack sequences, while [27] is completely host-based in
detecting compromised SSH sessions by looking directly at the commands
that are executed by the user.
Systems such as the one created in [28] work on stored datasets and do
the extraction of information oﬄine instead of using online monitors to feed
the data to the detection tool. In [29], Lee et al. describe the challenges
in creating a real-time intrusion detection system by using data-mining ap-
proaches. The topic of normalization is studied by the authors of [30], where
they compare and contrast four different strategies of normalization.
The authors of [31] describe the challenges with creating a big data intru-
sion detection system and advocate for the use of a more diverse heterogeneous-
based event source approach. This is what we explore in our work. In [32],
the authors discuss the difficulties of deploying intrusion detection systems
that are based on academic research. Our pipeline has this in mind and is
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built to facilitate the deployment of advanced intrusion detection systems.
Beehive is a system that tackles the heterogeneous log problem and deploys
in a large-scale production system [33]. However, this system stops short
of extracting useful host information and stays mostly on the network side.
Additionally, we believe that our pipeline is more generalized and suitable to
a wide array of easy deployments.
There has been research done into how to test intrusion detection systems,
but this research mainly focuses on creating representative inputs [34], [35].
The testing of the entire attack detection pipeline, from input to output, is
an area that is unexplored. In our work, we create a plug-and-play pipeline
that allows for the easy testing of arbitrary attack detection tools.
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CHAPTER 8
OPEN ISSUES AND LIMITATIONS
This chapter visits the known open issues and limitations of the proposed
data analytics pipeline.
• There is no way to identify a user on the network. You can get the IP
address, but if there is more than one user on that machine, then you
will be unable to narrow it down further.
• The IP address of the host is hardcoded into the Logstash-Forwarder
configuration file, instead of dynamically copied from the host’s infor-
mation.
• OSSEC’s file monitoring does not work well with the file editor Vim.
Vim edits files by creating a new copy of the file, making changes to
that file, deleting the original file, and then renaming the new file to
the correct name. OSSEC sees the deletion of the original file, but does
not see the creation of the new file. Thus, OSSEC will only report on
the first change of the file and nothing after that.
• OSSEC stops integrity checking after the 3rd change, which means that
if there are files that are changed frequently, the monitoring will stop
after the file is changed a few times. An attacker could easily use this
to fool the file monitoring by just making lots of quick changes before
they make any bad changes.
• OSSEC filters out hidden directories by looking for a . in the file path
after the initial directory. However, this approach is naive and therefore
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ignores all file paths that include a ./ regardless of where it occurs in
the path. For example, mkdir -p ./foo/.hidden dir would not be
logged because of the ./ even though the command is creating a hidden
directory.
• Bash mishandles the read host configuration alert, because it auto-
matically performs some of these system checks upon execution. They
have been filtered out in our experiments, but only by the exact exe-
cution of the command. If an attacker executed the commands, such
as uname in the exact same way, they would be filtered out as well.
• OSSEC only monitors hard-coded .ssh directories. These directory
names have to be hard-coded into the OSSEC configuration file as of
now, instead of being generalized to all users’ .ssh directories or, more
ideally, all .ssh directories that the SSH daemon uses.
• Currently, the alert ALERT MULTIPLE LOGIN refers to more than 1 user
logged into a single machine. In reality, the alert should be generalized
to more than 1 instance of a single user on a single machine.
• The alert ALERT HOST JUMP will only detect a single host jump from
one machine to another. Subsequent host jumps will be undetected.
Additionally, a single alert is created only every 720 seconds for host
jumps.
• Software updates will cause a flood of ALERT CHANGING SYSTEM FILES
alerts, even though the changes are legitimate, which will bias the
model towards a malicious user.
• The AttackTagger factor functions are all weighted equally, meaning
that there is an inherent assumption that all alerts are equally impor-
tant, even though that is unlikely to be the case.
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CHAPTER 9
FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
9.1 Future Work
Use of factor graphs is a logical next step in the evolution of attack detection.
Factor graphs combine the techniques of many different graphical networks
and are resilient to errors in the model. The factor graph model lets us benefit
from human expertise in the creation of the factor functions that define the
model, but we can take this a step further. We can allow for the human
to give dynamic feedback to the factor graph model as the users progress in
their threat level, which will allow for a reduction in false positives due to
known system failures, installations, shutdowns, etc. In addition, it will give
the human an opportunity to look at attacks as they are evolving and use
their own expertise on the severity of the attack. By allowing the humans
to give their own bias to the model, we have made a much more robust and
accurate response engine.
We have proven theoretically that factor graphs are very good at detecting
attacks in their early stages in our past works. However, these works are
using the cleanest possible logs as input for detection. There is little to no
noise in the input and so the detection is not perturbed. However, when
looking at real data, like the data that we have mined from our honeypots,
we have experienced lots of randomness and noise. No system is perfect and
so the monitors will give off false alerts. Even if the monitors were perfect,
not every alert is necessarily meaningful to the user all of the time. For
example, compiling code can be very suspicious if a user then escalates to
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root privilege after doing so. But compiling code could also very well just
be a user installing a new system service that they compiled from source. So
in this case, normal behavior such as compiling code is noise to the attack
detection scheme, because it does not pertain to an evolving attack.
There are two logical ways to combat the issue of ambiguous alerts. The
first is to define more fine-grained factor functions that would more specif-
ically cover the events that cause an attack and cut out some of the more
general events that lead to false positives. Adding more factor functions in-
definitely would then present a new problem of scalability, since the possible
attack sequences are numerous and constantly change with the evolution of
new attacks. Trying to eliminate false positives by enumerating every possi-
ble sequence of an attack rather than looking for a general attack structure
is a laborious task and is not feasible for the long-term. The second logical
step would be to introduce a more general model that can learn the factor
functions on its own. Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) are a generalized
version of factor graphs and can learn the factor functions from training in-
put. Given a robust test set, we can train an RNN to detect a multitude
of attacks, including variants of these attacks, without suffering from a high
false positive rate due to too general factor functions or a large amount of
work from defining lots of specific factor functions.
The other problem that has yet to be addressed about the factor graphs is
the real-time attack detection. There are two ends of this problem that are
pulling in opposite directions. On the one end you have a need for accurate
detection, which requires a large graphical model, lots of information as the
input, and many factor functions so as to reduce false positives/negatives.
Large amounts of factor functions require large amounts of processing. On
the other end you have a need for real-time or near real-time detection of the
attack, which requires the processing to be quick and, therefore, the graphical
model and amount of information to be smaller. Finding an appropriate
balance between detection and speed is an open problem.
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9.2 Conclusion
In this work, we have designed, validated, and deployed a scalable data an-
alytics pipeline for real-time attack detection. Using this pipeline, we are
able to achieve online early detection of attacks as well as oﬄine analysis of
attacks and testing of attack detection tools. Our pipeline is modular and
can be replicated by any individual with access to tools that perform the
same operations as the ones that we have shown. In addition, our pipeline
can be extended to handle heavy workloads, and any arbitrary inputs (e.g.
alerts) and outputs (e.g. attack detection tools).
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APPENDIX A
ATTACKTAGGER ALERTS
This is an explanation of the set of all alerts that are consumed by Attack-
Tagger. Table A.1 lists the data source, attack state, and rule for each of the
alerts.
ALERT INTERNAL ADDRESS SCAN
This alert is triggered when a large number of failed connection at-
tempts happen over a short period of time for either addresses or ports.
ALERT WATCHED COUNTRY LOGIN
This alert is triggered when a user successfully logs in from a IP located
in a country defined in Bro’s watched countries variable.
ALERT SSH BRUTEFORCE
This alert is triggered when Bro detects a large number of failed SSH
attempts over a short period of time.
ALERT MALWARE HASH REGISTRY MATCH
This alert is triggered when Bro finds that the MD5 sum of a file being
transferred over the network matches any MD5 sum in Team Cymru’s
Malware Hash Registry (MHR).
ALERT INVALID MIME EXT
This alert is triggered when a file being transferred over the network
has a different extension than is indicated by its MIME type.
ALERT HIGH NETWORKFLOWS
This alert is triggered when the throughput of traffic over the course of
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one minute is greater than 2 standard deviations above the mean over
the last 24 hours.
WEIRD IRC SERVER
This alert is triggered when an IRC client’s nickname matches one of
the regular expression scripts from the IRC bot detection tool named
Rishi [36].
ALERT WEIRD URL NAME
This alert is triggered when a connection is made to a URL that con-
tains unusual characters or other malicious sorts of injection techniques
that are not normally found in normal URLs.
ALARM ANOMALOUS HOST
This alert is triggered when a connection is made to a host that is
defined in the Critical-Stack-Intel list for malicious hosts.
ALERT HIGH RISK DOMAIN
This alert is triggered when a connection is made to a domain that is
defined in the Critical-Stack-Intel list for malicious domains.
ALERT MALICIOUS URL
This alert is triggered when a connection is made to a URL that is
defined in the Critical-Stack-Intel list for malicious URLs.
ALERT HOSTING HIDDEN SPAM
This alert is triggered when Bro notices a large number of email rejec-
tions from a single source or when it notes other spam-like behavior
from the host.
ALERT DOWNLOAD SENSITIVE EXTENSION
This alert is triggered when a file is transferred over the network with
a sensitive extension/MIME type, such as .exe.
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ALERT ANOMALOUS SSH LOGIN
This alert is triggered when there is an SSH login from a host with a
lexically unusual hostname as defined by Bro.
ALERT NEW USER
This alert is triggered when a new user is added on the host.
ALERT SUDO BRUTEFORCE
This alert is triggered when there are a large number of failed sudo
attempts over a short period of time.
ALERT NEW HIDDEN FILE TMP LOCATION
This alert is triggered when OSSEC’s rootcheck detection detects a new
hidden file on the system.
ALERT FAILED PASSWORD
This alert is triggered when the user fails a password authentication.
ALERT CHANGE CREDENTIAL
This alert is triggered when the users changes their password.
login
This alert is triggered when a user logs into the system.
new authorized keys
This alert is triggered when a user modifies the authorized keys file and
thus adds in a new way to login to the system.
ALERT NEW SERVICE
This alert is triggered when a new service is added to System V or
Upstart. This alert is checked every 10 seconds.
ALARM MULTIPLE LOGIN
This alert is triggered when multiple users are logged onto the same
machine.
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read host configuration
This alert is triggered when a user fingerprints the host configuration,
such as OS, kernel version, running processes, and more.
ALERT DOWNLOAD SECURITY TOOLS
This alert is triggered when a user downloads tools that are primarily
used only for security.
ALERT DISABLE LOGGING
This alert is triggered when the system logging is turned off by shutting
down rsyslog or by deleting the BASH HISTORY environment variable.
ALERT HOST JUMP
This alert is triggered when a user SSH logs into the host and then
connects to a different host using SSH.
ALERT WEIRD DIRECTORY NAME
This alert is triggered when a directory with a lexically unusual name
is created. It is also triggered when hidden directories are created.
ALERT WEIRD ACCOUNT NAME
This alert is triggered when a user with a lexically unusual name is
created.
ALERT COMPILING CODE
This alert is triggered when a compiler is run on the system, such as
gcc, cmake, and others.
ALERT PRIVILEGE ESCALATION
This alert is triggered when a user escalates their privileges to sudo or
root.
ALERT CHANGING SYSTEM FILES
This alert is triggered when a user changes system files that require
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root access to change. These directories include /etc, /usr/bin,
/usr/sbin, /bin, and /sbin.
ALERT GET LOGGEDIN USERS
This alert is triggered when a user attempts to read the users that are
currently logged into the system or the users that have last been logged
into the system.
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APPENDIX B
RECREATING AND USING THE
PIPELINE
Anyone who is interested in obtaining the source code of the pipeline should
contact the System Administrator of the DEPEND research group at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
B.1 Using the Pipeline
Start up the honeypots, aggregator, and collector. Logstash-forwarder, Logstash,
Bro, OSSEC, all of the host monitors, Elasticsearch, and Kibana are all set
up as system services that will start up on their respective machines at boot
time.
Make sure that all monitors are set up correctly and running. Once they
are, have Logstash aggregate and normalize them. You will have to write
some sort of filter to normalize these logs to the consistent format that all of
the logs currently share. This can be achieved through an OSSEC decoder
and rule if the monitor is on the host. If the log is network-based, the best
way to normalize the log is to write a Logstash filter.
Once the logs are aggregated on Logstash, it will output them wherever
the configuration file has told it to. In most cases, it will at least write out to
/var/log/logstash/logstash.stdout. Confirm that the logs are getting
aggregated before moving onward.
If Logstash is running correctly on the collector, it will also be outputting
its logs to Kafka. Kafka needs to be explicitly run on the host, as it is not
configured to start up at boot time. To run Kafka correctly, you will need to
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start up a Zookeeper node and a Kafka server node. These can both be easily
done by referencing the Kafka Quickstart guide on the Kafka website [15].
You can check to make sure that Kafka is collecting the logs by running a
simple Kafka console client that comes packaged with the Kafka source code.
Now that Kafka is collecting the logs, we can start up the attack detection
tool. In our case, this is AttackTagger. However, the only requirements for
the attack detection tool in our deployment are that it be able to consume
the normalized logs that we feed it and that it can consume from Kafka. If
you have your own attack detection tool, you can swap AttackTagger out for
it. Also, if your attack detection tool has a different normalized format than
ours, you can add an additional filter in Logstash to change the formats.
B.2 Recreating the Pipeline
To recreate the pipeline, follow the general structure of Chapter 3. If you
would like to build your own pipeline using the same tools as are discussed
in this work, refer to Chapter 4 or contact the DEPEND group and ask for
a copy of the source code.
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